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ABSTRACT
This paper offers a new framework for the 
assessment of financial market liquidity and 
identifies two types: search liquidity and 
systemic liquidity. Search liquidity, i.e. liquidity 
in “normal” times, is driven by search costs 
required for a trader to find a willing buyer for 
an asset he/she is trying to sell or vice versa. 
Search liquidity is asset specific. Systemic 
liquidity, i.e. liquidity in “stressed” times, is 
driven by the homogeneity of investors: the 
degree to which one’s decision to sell is related 
to the decision to sell made by other market 
players at the same time. Systemic liquidity is 
specific to market participants’ behaviour. This 
framework proves fairly powerful in identifying 
the role of credit derivatives and transparency 
for liquidity of corporate bond markets. We 
have applied it to the illiquid segments of the 
European credit market and found that credit 
derivatives are likely to improve search liquidity 
as well as systemic liquidity. However, it is 
possible that in their popular use today, credit 
derivatives reinforce a concentration of 
positions that can worsen systemic liquidity. 
We also found that post-trade transparency has 
surprisingly little bearing on liquidity in that 
where it improves liquidity it is merely acting 
as a proxy for pre-trade transparency or 
transparency of holdings. We conclude that if 
liquidity is the objective, pre-trade transparency, 
as well as some delayed transparency on net 
exposures and concentrations, is likely to be 
more supportive of both search and systemic 
liquidity than post-trade transparency.
JEL classification: G14, G15 and G18
Keywords: financial market functioning, 
liquidity, transparency, credit markets and 
financial innovation 5
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
The ongoing debate on the MiFID transparency 
requirements has led to some unease amongst 
market participants, commentators and policy-
makers that a combination of financial 
innovation in the credit risk transfer markets 
and some regulatory initiatives could undermine 
the capacity of financial markets to be 
reasonably and consistently liquid. This is not 
an arcane concern, especially with regard to the 
extension of equity transparency requirements 
to corporate bond markets. To date the analysis 
of the role of credit derivatives and trading 
transparency requirements for liquidity has 
been constrained by the absence of a solid basis 
for what drives liquidity and liquidity risk 
(liquidity risk is the likelihood that an instrument 
cannot be sold for cash instantaneously). We 
offer a new framework that identifies two types 
of liquidity: search liquidity and systemic 
liquidity. In “normal” times, liquidity is driven 
by search costs required for a trader to find a 
willing buyer for an asset he/she is trying to sell 
or vice versa. Search liquidity is asset specific. 
In “stressed” times liquidity is driven by the 
homogeneity of investors: the degree to which 
one’s decision to sell is related to the decision 
to sell made by other market players at the same 
time. Systemic liquidity is specific to market 
participants’ behaviour. We feel an overemphasis 
has been placed on search liquidity and 
instruments, when systemic liquidity and 
behaviour is just as important, if not more so. 
This indicates that policy-makers, when taking 
initiatives, need to take both types of liquidity 
into consideration because a trade-off may exist 
between the two. This framework proves fairly 
powerful in identifying the role of credit 
derivatives and transparency for liquidity. We 
have applied it to the illiquid segments of the 
European credit market and found that credit 
derivatives are likely to improve search liquidity 
as well as systemic liquidity. However, it is 
possible that in their popular use today, credit 
derivatives reinforce a concentration of 
positions that can worsen systemic liquidity. 
We also found that post-trade transparency has 
surprisingly little bearing on liquidity in that 
where it improves liquidity it is merely acting 
as a proxy for pre-trade transparency or 
transparency of holdings. We conclude that if 
liquidity is the objective, pre-trade transparency, 
as well as some delayed transparency on net 
exposures and concentrations, is likely to be 
more supportive of both search and systemic 
liquidity than post-trade transparency.
1 INTRODUCTION 
Developed, well-functioning financial markets 
play a vital role in today’s economy. They are 
used to allocate capital resources and manage 
risks and so they ultimately contribute to 
economic growth. It is often said that one of the 
reasons for the comparatively strong economic 
growth in the United States in recent years has 
been the depth and liquidity of its financial 
markets in general and its corporate bond 
market in particular. This viewpoint is well 
reflected in the following statement from 
2002:
The openness of the U.S. financial system, its 
depth and liquidity, and fierce competition have 
strongly contributed to our economy’s growth 
potential and efficiency. Countless academic 
studies show that efficient capital markets are a 
potent disciplinary force that enhance 
productivity, strengthen consumer choice and 
welfare, and offer borrowers capital at costs 
best suited to promoting investment.1
The liquidity of US markets may be related to 
their size, the size of the US economy and the 
consequent use of the US currency as a vehicle 
currency for international investments. These 
are reasons why many non-US companies issue 
1 INTRODUCTION
1   Testimony by Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for 
International Affairs, Randal Quarles, 22 May 2002, 
Congressional hearing on the EU's Financial Services Action 
Plan (FSAP).6
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dollar-denominated corporate bonds.2 But 
financial market liquidity is also linked to the 
functioning of the markets and the way in which 
they are organised and regulated – features that, 
unlike market size, can be directly influenced 
by the authorities.3 Indeed, financial innovation 
is often a response to regulation and such 
innovation can play a big part in the evolution 
of financial liquidity.4
This paper is concerned with trading liquidity, 
which is related to the depth, immediacy, 
tightness and resiliency of a market, and in 
particular with the factors that may influence 
trading liquidity in the EUR 1,500 billion euro 
area corporate bond market.5 The wider 
economic effects of trading liquidity are as 
important in the corporate bond market as 
anywhere else. Large liquidity premia, i.e. the 
additional cost a borrower has to pay because 
the instrument of borrowing cannot be easily 
turned into cash, will raise the cost of capital 
for companies, which would in turn dampen 
investment spending. It is commonly thought 
that liquidity premia are generally very 
negligible, except in small emerging markets, 
but while this may be true for euro-denominated 
sovereign debt issued by euro area governments 
or frequently traded equities, liquidity premia 
can be significant for many markets. It is 
important to note that only a few European 
corporate bonds trade on a daily or weekly 
basis, while the majority of tradable debt issues 
trade less than once a month or even once a 
quarter. 
Liquidity premium is the additional yield that 
compensates investors for the risk of being 
unable to liquidate a position immediately. Its 
measurement is not straightforward because of 
difficulties in recording and standardising 
liquidity measurements, and in the case of bond 
markets there is also an absence of published 
data of the same detail and frequency that the 
retail equity markets demand. We will discuss 
these issues in greater depth later. But our 
starting point is that liquidity risk premia can 
be significant, even in developed market 
economies. Partial and indirect evidence for 
this comes from the outperformance of liquid 
equity exchanges by private equity funds, which 
are in large part earning a liquidity risk premium 
by investing in less liquid assets. Between 1990 
and 2004, for example, these funds returned an 
average 160 basis points more every year than 
the S&P 500. 
Market participants argue that it is not just the 
level of trading liquidity that concerns them, 
but also its variability.6 An old banker’s joke is 
that a banker is someone who lends you an 
umbrella when it is sunny and asks for it back 
when it starts to rain. It is easier to manage 
investments when the degree of liquidity is low 
but steady than if liquidity appears when you 
are passing by and do not need it, but disappears 
when you do. An extreme form of variability is 
a liquidity crisis. Almost all major financial 
crises, such as the Tequila crisis (1994-95), the 
Asian financial crisis (1997-98) and the LTCM 
debacle (1998), started off life as a trading 
liquidity crisis in markets or sectors that were 
considered reasonably liquid.7 The financial, 
economic and social costs of these crises may 
be large.8 Liquidity crises can destroy companies 
and paralyse countries. Preventing them is an 
important concern of the authorities. 
Two connected concepts relevant to liquidity 
crises are (i) “artificial liquidity” – liquidity 
that appears to be there but disappears when it 
is needed; and (ii) “liquidity black holes” – 
specific periods when liquidity disappears, only 
to reappear a few days or weeks later. There is 
2  In the first three quarters of 2005, for example, USD 161 billion 
of dollar-denominated debt was issued by non-US borrowers, 
which represented almost 60% of total US dollar issuance over 
the period. See BIS (2005).
3  See O’Hara (2001) for an excellent overview of these issues. 
4  See Kane (1986) for early work on this subject, and Tufano 
(2002) for a comprehensive review of the literature. 
5 See  ECB  (2006).
6 See  Appendix. 
7 See  Cai  (2003).
8  For example, Eichengreen (2004) estimates that the cost of 
financial crises in emerging markets in the last quarter of the 
20th century reduced the incomes of the countries concerned by 
25%. 7
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some evidence that both artificial liquidity and 
liquidity black holes have become more plentiful 
as a result of the way in which markets are 
organised and regulated and new instruments 
traded. In particular, there is evidence in the 
more liquid equity and government bond 
markets of greater positive feedback between 
prices and the direction of trades.9 
Given the importance of trading liquidity in the 
corporate bond market for the functioning of 
the economy, given assertions that it is related 
to factors under the control of the authorities 
such as transparency, funding and trading rules, 
and given worries that both artificial liquidity 
and black holes are increasingly prevalent, there 
are more than enough reasons for European 
authorities to be interested in a better 
understanding of trading liquidity. In fact, 
trading liquidity ranks high in central banks’ 
financial stability concerns because if it 
suddenly disappears down a “black hole” it may 
cause a liquidity crisis with systemic 
implications. If a central bank, as is the case for 
the Eurosystem, accepts corporate bonds as 
collateral in its credit operations, the trading 
liquidity of the assets – and of the markets on 
which these assets are traded – is also relevant 
for operational reasons. The ability to properly 
price and rapidly liquidate collateral is one of 
the core requirements for efficient collateral 
management.
To help address these issues, this paper sets out 
a simple and testable analytical framework for 
trading liquidity that is designed to apply to a 
wide range of markets but in particular to the 
many European corporate bonds that trade 
infrequently. We examine what this framework 
tells us about two developments: financial 
innovations in the credit arena and the role of 
any increased disclosure and transparency in 
European corporate bond trading. The focus is 
therefore on the liquidity impact. We do not aim 
to assess the broader implications for market 
efficiency and fairness.
But before we do that, we put this study in 
context by describing regulatory developments 
and market participants’ concerns (which we 
expand on in the Appendix), reviewing the 
academic literature and commenting on 
differences between the European corporate 
bond market and those markets from which 
most of the academic literature is derived: US 
equity markets.  
2  THE CONTEXT: REGULATORY INITIATIVES, 
ACADEMIC RESEARCH AND LESSONS TO BE 
DRAWN FROM THE UNITED STATES 
2.1  RECENT REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS AND 
MARKET CONCERNS 
Recently, regulatory focus and activity in the 
trading area has been on increasing disclosure 
of trade information in the bond markets, 
especially post-trade information.10 In large 
part this is an extension of disclosure 
requirements that exist in equity markets. These 
efforts have been particularly pronounced in 
the United States, where the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) has mandated the 
National Association of Securities Dealers 
(NASD) with developing a platform through 
which, ultimately, trades in most corporate 
bonds will be disclosed almost instantly.11 EU 
regulators, although they have not formulated 
such a requirement as yet, are, in preparation 
for the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID), studying the possibility of 
enlarging the scope of the primarily equity-
oriented trading information disclosure 
requirements to “instruments other than 
shares”. 
9   See Persaud (2003), Cohen (2003) and Nesvetailova (2005) for 
a description of the concept of liquidity black holes and 
Hasbrouck (2000) for further analysis on the US treasury and 
stock markets. 
10  Pre-trade transparency relates to information on current trading 
interest. Transparency of orders and/or dealer quotations 
provides the market-place with information on prices and 
sometimes also quantities in which market participants are 
willing to trade. Post-trade transparency relates to the prices and 
volumes of completed transactions.
11   This platform, called the Trade Reporting and Compliance 
Engine (TRACE), facilitates the mandatory reporting of OTC 
transactions in eligible fixed income securities.
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According to financial industry associations, 
this spread of transparency rules to the corporate 
bond market does not appear to be in response 
to any groundswell of concern that these 
markets are suffering from a problem that needs 
a solution – a necessary requirement for 
regulatory intervention.12 Moreover, many 
market participants, especially the large banks 
and dealers, have expressed concern that a 
simple “mechanistic” transfer of transparency 
requirements from equity to bond markets is 
inappropriate and may have an adverse impact 
on the liquidity of some important market 
segments. 
Regulatory interest in bond market transparency 
appears to have been stimulated by changes in 
the pattern of demand for bonds. There are 
indications that the bond markets in general, 
and corporate bond markets in particular, play 
an increasing role in investors’ portfolios. 
Several factors are likely to contribute to this 
increased role, one of the most important being 
the changing trend in demography, especially in 
Europe. It is expected that an ageing population 
will invest more in bond markets, be it directly 
or indirectly through means of collective 
investment, and, as a consequence, increased 
interest by regulators in the bond markets and 
their functioning may be anticipated. Related 
trends are already visible. Today, market 
participants complain of a bubble in bond prices 
as a result of extra demand from pension funds. 
New measures related to, or aimed primarily at, 
retail investor protection are being taken or 
proposed on both sides of the Atlantic. 
However, regulators would not wish to increase 
transparency in order to protect consumers only 
to find that their actions had reduced liquidity. 
In turning to the literature for help in assessing 
concerns expressed by market participants on a 
potential trade-off between liquidity and 
transparency it becomes clear that this is an 
area that is generally poorly researched. Most 
conclusions are guided by the results of studies 
that are focused on US equity markets, which 
have both different liquidity conditions and 
different reasons for transparency rules. We 
will discuss these differences in greater detail 
later. 
2.2  DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF LIQUIDITY IN 
THE LITERATURE 
Studies on liquidity in equity and government 
bond markets are relatively numerous, and this 
may be attributable to the availability of pricing 
data and trading turnover on these markets. 
Most of these studies concentrate on some 
quoted measure of trading liquidity, such as 
bid-ask spread or trading volume. However, 
data on trading activity for corporate bond 
markets are more difficult to obtain and the 
number of studies dedicated to corporate bonds 
is much smaller. To some extent the introduction 
of the TRACE corporate bond trade reporting 
system in the United States on 20 March 2002 
has led to a few more studies on corporate bond 
market liquidity, but this is still too recent to 
provide a rich vein of analysis and conclusion. 
Almost no attention is paid to illiquid, 
infrequently traded instruments, not least 
because bid-ask spreads or trading volume data 
for these instruments are often non-existent. 
The paradox is that data on liquidity is most 
available for those markets where liquidity is 
not a problem. 
Besides data, another factor holding up the 
growth of analysis in liquidity is a lack of 
common definitions or measures. A review of 
the literature on liquidity in general reveals that 
“liquidity” has many different meanings in 
different, though to add to the confusion, 
related, contexts. Macro-economists, for 
example, often refer to high-powered liquidity 
when they are referring to money supply. The 
instruments of liquidity in this case would be 
activities such as open-market operations by 
the central bank, shifts in the level of interest 
rates and foreign exchange intervention. These 
issues are in many ways distinct from, for 
instance, the bid-ask spread quoted for a 
specific corporate bond issue, but the premium 
to be paid for the immediate liquidation of this 
12  See also FSA (2005) and the response by the BMA.9
ECB 
Occasional Paper No. 50
August 2006
bond is related to how much macro-liquidity 
there is in the system. Again at a macro level, 
central banks are more concerned about the 
factors that relate to liquidity crises.13 These 
factors are quite different, but are also related 
to the micro-structure of trading and what we 
may refer to as trading liquidity. 
As indicated above, our focus is on trading 
liquidity. Most of the general literature on 
trading liquidity suggests that it is related to the 
depth, immediacy, tightness and resiliency of a 
market. What these terms imply is that a liquid 
market is one where you can buy a bond without 
having to wait long to obtain a price quote, sell 
it immediately when needed, and pay a tight 
spread between the buying and selling price 
without the price level changing much. In such 
a market the forced liquidation of assets by a 
distressed seller does not cause the price to 
collapse. If, however, a market-maker buys a 
particular asset and loses money when he tries 
to sell it soon after, he would start to offset that 
risk by raising the difference, or spread, between 
his buying (bid) and selling (offer) price to the 
market. Consequently, it is conventionally 
thought that the best measure of trading liquidity 
is the bid-offer spread or more commonly 
described bid-ask spread. The liquidity risk 
premia – the extra yield required to compensate 
an investor for the inability to sell immediately 
without suffering a loss – should be closely 
related to the bid-ask spread. 
There has been some empirical work to try to 
identify the liquidity risk premia in corporate 
bond markets and what drives it. Most of the 
results confirm that liquidity is related to credit 
quality (Houwelink 2005, Driessen 2005), but 
this could be the result of a poor choice of 
instrumental variables used to measure the 
liquidity component of the yield spread, a large 
part of which is the credit risk premia. We 
would argue that liquidity risk is an important 
concept because it is not the same as credit risk. 
It is possible to imagine an instrument that has 
low liquidity but high credit quality, such as 
many asset-backed securities. 
Other studies have found a connection between 
the time after issuance and liquidity, the 
maturity of the bond and its liquidity 
(Chakravarty 1999, Goldreich 2003) or issue 
size (Fleming 2002). This seems to imply that 
the prospect of cash on redemption is a 
determining avenue of liquidity. It would make 
sense that a 12-month note was more liquid 
than a 10-year bond (the note would be redeemed 
for cash in a few months), but does that mean 
that a 5-year bond is more liquid than a 10-year 
bond? 
It would be fair to say that the empirical work 
on corporate bonds has not yet revealed much 
that we find compelling. That said, there are 
three elements of the literature that we draw on 
in this paper. Our definition of liquidity is that 
it is related to the discount you have to pay in 
order to sell an instrument immediately, 
compared with the price you would receive if 
you could afford to wait until a buyer willing to 
pay the “market” price appears. This follows 
from Ericsson (2005), though it is closely 
related to the well-known concept of the price 
impact of trading, i.e. the risk that the actual 
price of a transaction may be significantly 
different from the price quoted just before the 
transaction was made.14 We prefer this measure 
to quoted bid-ask spreads, which are increasingly 
related not to the actual difference between the 
price to buy and sell but commercial and 
regulatory pre-trade requirements. (One of the 
consequences of this is that dealers often quote 
a wide spread if they are forced to quote, or, if 
they do not have to quote, they will often just 
withdraw from the market in times of stress). 
Measures of liquidity that relate to factors other 
than bid-ask spreads often conflict during 
periods of stress – see Upper (2000).
13  See O’Hara (2004) and BIS (2001), for example. 
14  This definition can be inverted to provide a definition of time 
liquidity: the time it would take to sell an instrument without 
accepting a price discount. While much of the literature focuses 
on the price discount (see Fleming (2003) for an example of this 
approach applied to the US Treasury market), the time premia 
may be more relevant to market participants considering the 
maturity of the instruments they may use to fund an asset or 
invest against a liability - see Persaud (2006). See also Bervas 
(2006) for a description of impact measures.
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The second point that we can draw from the 
existing literature is the role of investor 
behaviour in general and the heterogeneity of 
investor behaviour in particular. Persaud (2002, 
2004) has argued that the less heterogeneous 
are investors’ valuations, investment horizons 
and risk management, the less trading liquidity 
there is when you need it – in times of market 
stress. This would help to explain concerns 
about the growth of artificial liquidity and 
liquidity black holes and has a bearing on 
transparency, which under certain circumstances 
may lead to more homogeneity. Indeed, a third 
element follows directly from Scalia (1999), 
who suggests that, in a specific case in the 
Italian government bond market, improved 
trading transparency has harmed the liquidity 
of bonds. This interesting but controversial 
view has been developed by others (O’Hara 
2004) and we shall return to these issues later. 
Before we leave the literature on liquidity in the 
corporate bond market, we must touch on the 
credit derivatives markets. In just a few years 
the use of credit derivatives has changed the 
way corporate bond markets operate, and it 
seems that the influence of credit derivatives 
will become more significant as these develop 
further.15 In a growing academic literature 
increasing attention is being paid to the 
functioning of credit derivatives and their links 
to other segments of the credit markets, as 
evidenced by several papers that have become 
available over the past few years. Zhu (2004), 
for example, examines more deeply the 
relationship between credit default swaps (CDS) 
and cash bond markets, concluding that their 
prices are highly correlated, especially in quiet 
times; in distressed markets the relationship is 
looser with CDS spreads becoming significantly 
wider than the spreads of corporate bonds.16 
Another interesting finding is that the difference 
between the corporate bond spread and CDS 
spread, known as CDS basis, is highly correlated 
with the CTD (cheapest-to-deliver) option 
value, i.e. the value of the different assets 
eligible to be delivered to the protection seller 
in the case of a credit event. Hull (2004) 
suggests using the CDS market to extract or 
confirm the risk-free rate on which credit 
market participants rely. Gomez (2003) finds 
that looking only at the relationship between 
credit derivatives and cash bond markets is 
insufficient, and suggests including equity 
markets as well in the analysis. Indeed, Cremers 
(2004) and Zhang (2005) find similar evidence, 
connecting the prices of CDS, corporate bond 
and equity markets.17 
The main distinction of the credit derivatives 
markets is their almost uninhibited liquidity 
during quiet times, at least compared with the 
cash bond markets. This feature has been the 
subject of several studies (see, for instance, 
Longstaff (2004)), as by comparing prices of 
cash bonds and credit derivatives a measure of 
the liquidity risk price can be derived. Also the 
CDS-bond basis is being increasingly studied 
(Levin, 2005). The credit derivatives market 
development in recent years also needs to be 
taken into account when considering the effects 
of the above-mentioned regulatory changes in 
the United States (Edwards, 2004).18
At the end of the day, however, the empirical 
literature on trading liquidity and credit markets 
in general and European credit markets in 
particular is still relatively sparse and 
inconclusive, so that the perceived wisdom that 
shapes policy initiatives in this area is based on 
research carried out in US equity markets or 
relatively liquid US bond markets. These 
markets are so different from European 
corporate bond markets that extreme care must 
be exercised. This is well illustrated by looking 
at the reasons behind regulatory requirements 
15  For a more detailed description of market innovations see Box 
1 Chapter 4.
16  It may be worthwhile to examine further whether the real reason 
may not lie in the fact that the cash bonds stop trading in 
distressed times and the real activity is going on in the CDS 
market, as suggested e.g. in CRMPG II (2005) or Naifar 
(2005).
17  Blanco (2005) concluded that CDS spreads led bond spread 
changes. Zhu (2004) and Norden (2004) came to a similar 
conclusion. 
18  Several market participants pointed to methodological 
inconsistencies in the argumentation about the causality of the 
introduction of TRACE and the fall in transaction costs for 
corporate bonds in the United States.11
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of pre- and post-trade transparency that exist 
for equity markets and are being considered for 
European corporate bond markets. 
2.3  WHAT LESSONS CAN BE DRAWN FROM US 
BOND OR EQUITY MARKETS? 
2.3.1  CORPORATE BONDS VERSUS EQUITIES: 
INVESTORS 
The equity market is a market for corporate 
control.19 There are many institutions that 
cannot or do not wish to raise finance by ceding 
control to investors, and there are many 
institutions that cannot own issuer-specific 
risk. Official institutions are a case in point. 
One of the consequences of this is that while 
equity markets have a large number of small 
retail investors and few official institutions, 
bond market investors tend to be dominated by 
institutions, many of them official.20 
It is generally supposed that retail investors 
need more protection than official institutions 
and therefore consumer protection is more of an 
issue in equity markets than in bond markets. In 
order to ensure that retail equity investors are 
not disadvantaged against professional brokers 
and intermediaries, regulators insist that much 
of the trading information that a broker or 
intermediary may be able to access is also easily 
accessible by retail investors. As the bond 
markets are dominated by a handful of 
institutional investors with a better ability to 
obtain market intelligence, the need for 
transparency regulation has not been seen as a 
priority. 
2.3.2  CORPORATE BONDS VERSUS EQUITIES: 
INSTRUMENTS
Many institutions are often just an agent for 
retail investors and so need protecting too. But 
there may be other reasons why investor 
protection issues have been relatively less 
important in the bond markets than in the equity 
markets. Unlike equities, bonds usually have a 
maturity date on which the principal is repaid. 
The bondholder can wait for his investment to 
mature to get the principal value back. The 
equity holder wanting to retrieve his investment 
has to rely solely on the secondary market, 
which makes the issue of trading transparency 
and investor protection from abusive trading 
practices more critical. The price of a bond 
relates to publicly available data on the overall 
level of interest rates, credit conditions and 
shifts in default risks. Most companies do not 
slip in and out of default and so, on a day-to-
day basis, the scope for insider knowledge to 
damage the interests of “outside” bond investors 
is narrower than the scope for insider knowledge 
in equity markets, where price is determined by 
any shift in likely future earnings. 
One of the principal avenues to dissuade and 
catch insider trading is through transparency of 
trade activity. Therefore, in equity markets the 
issue of post-trade transparency has a lot to do 
with investor protection and not very much to 
do with liquidity. This is different in bond 
markets, where retail investor participation is 
limited, so that investor protection could 
arguably play a less, and liquidity considerations 
a more, prominent role. Of course, as we 
mentioned earlier, the balance between liquidity 
and investor protection concerns may be shifting 
over time in the bond markets. 
2.3.3 US  VERSUS  EUROPEAN  MARKETS
The US corporate bond market is larger and 
more diversified than European markets. Bonds 
of various credit quality, from investment grade 
to speculative grade, are sold to a diversified 
investor base. Public credit ratings are widely 
used as a reference by both issuers and investors. 
The corporate bond market benefits significantly 
from the well-functioning US government bond 
market, which serves as a reference for pricing 
corporate issues. Trading activity is also highly 
concentrated, with a handful of large banks/
dealers controlling the lion’s share of the trading 
and syndication. Market supervision is 
performed by a single regulator, the SEC, and 
the self-regulatory functions are also highly 
concentrated. Client intermediation, especially 
19  See Scott (2004) for an overview of these issues. 
20  For example, at the end of the 1990s, the UK household sector 
held 20% of UK equity assets but just 1% of bond market assets 
(Davis, 2000).
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in the less liquid segments of the market, seems 
to be performed increasingly on an agency 
basis, without the dealers committing their own 
capital.
The European Union and specifically the euro 
area corporate bond markets have experienced 
remarkably fast development, especially since 
the introduction of the single currency. 
According to Casey (2005), the outstanding 
volumes almost quadrupled in the euro area 
between 1999 and 2004, while the ratio of 
outstanding corporate bond issues to GDP 
closed significantly the gap to the United States’ 
long-term average of 25% of GDP, to stand at 
more than 16% at the end of 2004 (in 1999 the 
euro area share was a mere 5%). The credit 
quality of issuers – previously limited mainly to 
high-quality large issuers or retail-oriented 
“household names” – is diversifying; the growth 
of the high yield markets has been remarkable, 
even though it started from a very low base. The 
use of ratings, previously limited to large high-
quality issuers, is also becoming more common. 
When pricing corporate issues in euro, the swap 
market is generally used, as the existence of 
several government bond yield curves makes it 
difficult to refer the pricing to a single 
benchmark. 
The supervisory functions are performed by 
several national bodies, and remaining 
differences in the national implementation of 
regulations add to the complications that banks 
encounter in order to be able to operate under 
the same rules across the European Union. The 
intermediation market is less concentrated than 
in the United States, with several dozen banks/
dealers competing for trading and syndication 
business. 
There is a higher level of competition in the 
European bond markets,21 and this is reflected 
in the level of pre-trade transparency in 
wholesale markets, which is greater than in the 
United States. Indeed, the pre-trade transparency 
in some liquid market segments is so high that 
it makes the real-time post-trade transparency 
for price discovery purposes obsolete. The 
interesting feature is that, when servicing their 
clients, banks in Europe act more often as 
principals, using their own capital even in some 
of the less liquid segments of the market.
A widely held view is that trading liquidity is 
about market size, turnover and the availability 
of information, and so the US market should be 
more liquid than the European market. However, 
there is evidence from equity markets that 
trading liquidity and market size are not 
synonymous22 and there are some theoretical 
and empirical challenges to the notion that 
transparency will improve liquidity.23 
One potentially very important distinction 
between the two markets is the different list of 
eligible assets that can be put forward to the 
central bank as collateral for credit operations. 
In the Eurosystem, the list includes non-
government, euro-denominated, fixed-income 
securities, and from January 2007 will include 
bank loans of sound credit quality. For all 
eligible assets the minimum acceptable credit 
rating corresponds to “A-”. The eligibility 
status of non-government assets is likely to 
make these instruments more “liquid”. In the 
United States, the Federal Reserve System only 
allows a narrow range of public-sector related 
bonds to be used as collateral for open-market 
operations. Allowing certain corporate bonds to 
be used as collateral for credit operations should 
have a significant impact on their liquidity. This 
impact may prove greater than issues of 
transparency and financial innovation, for 
instance, and deserves further study.
3  WHAT ACTUALLY DRIVES LIQUIDITY? AN 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK OF LIQUIDITY
Financial instruments yield the risk-free rate of 
return (for the purposes of this paper, we define 
it as the corresponding maturity point on the 
21  This is also highlighted in the response to the FSA discussion 
paper on trading transparency in the UK secondary bond market 
– see BMA (2005).
22  See Persaud (2001). 
23  See O’Hara (1995) and Persaud (2000).13
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government or swap yield curve) plus a premium 
for additional risks, principal among them 
being credit and liquidity premia. The credit 
premium is the additional yield that investors 
demand as compensation for the risk of default 
as well as the volatility and unpredictability of 
this risk. The liquidity premium24 of a corporate 
bond is the additional yield investors demand as 
compensation for the potential reduction in 
price they may have to accept if they require 
cash immediately and are forced to sell the 
bond.
Liquidity risk is often thought of as the price 
impact of trading. The change in price of the 
financial instrument as a consequence of a trade 
has different drivers during different market 
environments, leading us to believe that there 
are two types of trading liquidity, which, 
interestingly, may pull against each other. 
During “quiet times”, the liquidity premium is 
driven by “search” costs: the cost in time, 
information asymmetries and uncertainties, as 
well as capital, funding, inventory and research 
costs required for a trader25 to locate a willing 
buyer for a “stock” that it has recently purchased. 
It is likely that the quoted bid-ask spread during 
quiet times is a representation of this search 
cost, and that these search costs are differentiated 
across different market instruments, being 
smallest for US government bonds and much 
larger for small European corporate bonds. We 
call this type of liquidity “search liquidity”. This 
type of liquidity is asset specific. 
For the instruments that concern us – bonds and 
tradable debt that do not trade on a daily basis 
and sometimes not even on a monthly or 
quarterly basis – an important element of the 
liquidity premium that relates to “search costs” 
is the uncertainty premium attached to estimates 
of these costs. 
It is probable that technology and transparency 
help to improve “search liquidity”. At one 
extreme, if a seller of a corporate bond could go 
to a common trading venue and potential buyers 
of bonds with similar characteristics are there 
looking for bonds to buy, search costs could be 
kept low. The advent of electronic trading 
platforms with extensive pre-trade disclosure is 
supporting a reduction in search costs and 
search cost uncertainties.
During times of market stress, when investor 
risk-appetite has fallen, uncertainties increase 
and a “herd of investors” are bailing out of their 
positions, a very substantial price reduction is 
required to turn a seller into a buyer. This 
contrarian buyer must consider that while he 
can go against the market today and perhaps 
come out on top tomorrow, he runs the risk of 
being forced to sell at a lower price if the market 
falls for longer than he can remain solvent. The 
buyer needs to be compensated for this risk 
before he contemplates it. This is also a liquidity 
problem – the intrinsic worth of the asset has 
not changed and sometime in the near future 
buyers will again be plentiful at current prices. 
But this liquidity is not really about long-term 
search costs. On this occasion the driver of the 
liquidity premium is the homogeneity of 
investors. If investors are homogeneous in their 
information, valuation, risk management and 
thus behaviour, and are reducing their exposure 
to certain risks simultaneously, finding a buyer 
is almost impossible.26 The liquidity to sell 
disappears down a black hole. We call this 
systemic liquidity.27 This type of liquidity is 
related to the behaviour of market participants. 
It is not well measured by bid-ask spreads, not 
24  The liquidity premium approximates the difference between the 
observed corporate bond yield spreads and the smaller 
theoretical spreads derived from default probabilities.
25  There are various types of liquidity providers, that is traders that 
act as intermediaries by buying and selling. The main types of 
such traders are market-makers, banks’ proprietary traders and 
hedge funds. Furthermore, for a detailed analysis of capital and 
funding costs see Brunnermeier (2005a) and Weill (2004). 
Information asymmetries and inventory costs are also dealt with 
by Kyle (1985), Glosten (1985) and Grossmann (1988).
26  Other authors point out that a financial crisis is a disruption to 
financial markets caused by excessive information asymmetries. 
See, for instance, Mishkin (1991).
27  Another term sometimes used to describe systemic liquidity is 
“endogenous liquidity” as opposed to “exogenous liquidity” or 
search costs. See Bervas (2006) for a comprehensive review, 
including methods to capture extreme liquidity risk. Other 
analysts have called search liquidity “fair weather liquidity”. 
Finally, relevant classifications such as market liquidity and 
funding liquidity as well as predatory trading are introduced by 
Brunnermeier (2005a and 2005b). 
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least because it is highly variable and, at times 
of stress, market participants complain that the 
size of trade for which the quoted spreads are 
applicable collapses to the regulatory minimum 
size. In such situations, quoted spreads are 
often not representative of the spreads that 
market participants are paying, and sometimes 
the quotes disappear altogether. It raises a point 
we will come back to, that trading liquidity is 
often seen through the prism of instruments 
(some instruments are said to be liquid and 
others illiquid), although this is perhaps better 
understood through the prism of market 
behaviour (a change in behaviour may make the 
same instrument go from liquid to illiquid or 
vice versa).
One testable definition and identification of 
systemic illiquidity and a liquidity black hole is 
where the normal correlation of falling prices 
attracting buyers reverses, so that falling prices 
lead to further selling. If falling prices, thanks 
to investors’ heterogeneous expectations and 
behaviour, attract buyers, the price impact of a 
sell order is limited and liquidity would be 
considered to be good. If, on the other hand, a 
sell order leads to falling prices which 
consequently lead to further selling and further 
price falls, the price impact of the sell order is 
substantial and liquidity would be considered to 
be poor. 
This measure provides evidence of a number of 
periods of systemic illiquidity (and liquidity 
black holes) for instruments that trade 
frequently, usually with tight bid-ask spreads, 
and would normally be considered highly 
liquid.28 However, in order to carry out this 
measurement information is required on prices 
and flows which is seldom available for assets 
that do not trade daily. (One impact of post-
trade transparency on liquidity is that we would 
be better able to measure liquidity.)
In addition to the emerging empirical evidence, 
few traders and market commentators doubt 
that this behaviour exists. The issue is what 
causes it. What makes investors change from 
considering falling prices as a buying 
opportunity to perceiving them a selling signal? 
It is likely that the increasing standardisation of 
valuation (such as mean-variance optimisation) 
and risk-management tools and real-time post-
trade transparency promotes homogeneity. 
Because market prices are increasingly part of 
a similar risk-return calculation for investors, 
the market conditions that lead one investor to 
sell also lead others to do so at the same time. 
It is possible too to see a tension between 
systemic liquidity and search liquidity. An 
environment where transparent electronic 
communication networks or exchanges 
undermine the role of market-makers and their 
balance sheets could be one where search 
liquidity is improved at the expense of systemic 
liquidity, and where reported bid-ask spreads 
narrow, but occasions of severe market 
dislocation become more significant and 
frequent. Foreign exchange markets are an 
example of markets where, during quiet times, 
quoted bid-ask spreads are wafer thin and for 
the euro/dollar market less than 2 basis points, 
reflecting minute search costs. However, the 
foreign exchange markets also frequently 
exhibit occurrences where the market appears 
to be in dislocation, jumping to new levels.29 
Factors that increase systemic liquidity may 
reduce search liquidity. For example, 
heterogeneity in the behaviour of market players 
may improve systemic liquidity. If  insurance 
companies and pension funds behave as long-
term investors and so, for example, a fall in the 
banking sector’s risk appetite for corporate 
bonds does not have an impact on them and they 
buy what the banking sector is selling, systemic 
liquidity is preserved. However, long-term 
investor behaviour usually results in a “locking-
up” of stock in various places away from the 
market-place, reducing the “free-float” of a 
bond issue and therefore increasing the search 
costs of trying to match buyers with sellers 
during quiet times.
28  See Cohen (2003) and Hasbrouck (2000) for further analysis on 
the US treasury and stock markets. See also Tambakis (2006) 
and Gibson (2000). 
29  See Persaud (2003).15
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Our framework suggests that these trade-offs 
may exist. But do they? Is search liquidity really 
getting better at the expense of systemic 
liquidity? It is hard to tell with certainty, but the 
partial evidence that exists is cause for concern. 
In some large transparent markets, there is 
evidence of a worsening frequency of liquidity 
black holes, yet bid-ask spreads, where reported, 
have shrunk over time although they appear to 
have reached a floor in many markets. In a study 
using exchange data on flows and prices, McCoy 
(2004)30 found positive feedback between prices 
and flows (today’s price declines bring out more 
sellers, not stabilising bargain hunters) in 
several markets, where quoted spreads were a 
fraction of one tenth of a per cent. The analysis 
focused on a range of currency markets (USD/
JPY, USD/CHF, USD/CAD) between 1999 and 
2002 and also on the US Treasury market (two-
year and ten-year notes) between 1992 and 
1997. The implication is that markets that 
exhibit good search liquidity were exhibiting 
frequent periods of systemic illiquidity. 
To sum up, our simple analytical framework for 
trading liquidity distinguishes between two 
types of liquidity, search and systemic liquidity, 
which may act against each other, depending on 
market conditions. During “quiet” times, the 
liquidity premium is driven by “search” costs, 
i.e. the cost in time, information asymmetries, 
as well as capital, funding, inventory and 
research costs required for a trader to locate a 
willing buyer for an asset that he has purchased. 
In distressed market conditions, the driver of 
the liquidity premium is the homogeneity of 
investors. If investors are homogeneous in their 
behaviour, the liquidity disappears down a 
black hole. This framework allows for an 
examination of the search or systemic avenues 
along which any development, be it financial 
innovation or improved transparency, will have 
an impact on liquidity. It also indicates that 
policy-makers need to show concern for both 
search and systemic liquidity. They should be 
alert to the possibility that initiatives which 
appear to improve the most visible form of 
liquidity – “search liquidity” – may be doing so 
at the expense of another important form of 
liquidity – “systemic liquidity”. 
4  THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION 
ON TRADING LIQUIDITY
Over the last few years, European credit markets 
have seen rapid innovation. Financial 
innovations are affecting the management of 
credit risk, hence the functioning of credit 
markets and ultimately the liquidity risk of 
corporate bonds, both in quiet and distressed 
market conditions. This chapter provides some 
initial considerations on the impact that 
financial innovations and, in particular, the 
enhanced interaction of cash and derivatives 
markets may have on search and systemic 
liquidity. Further work is needed to gain a better 
understanding of developments that, unhelpfully 
from an analytical perspective, are unfolding 
and are rapidly changing previously reached 
conclusions.
30 See also Fleming (1999) and Cohen (2003).
Box 1
RECENT FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS AFFECTING LIQUIDITY IN CREDIT MARKETS
The main market-driven innovations that have an impact on the liquidity of credit risk markets 
are mentioned below (see also the Appendix). They have enhanced the trading of corporate 
bonds and in particular credit derivatives, whose markets are nowadays more innovative, 
diversified and often more liquid than the underlying cash markets. Also in terms of price 
efficiency, prices available in the CDS market are increasingly accepted as a reference price 
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source for pricing corporate bonds. According to BIS data, notional amounts outstanding of 
credit default swaps rose by 60% from $6.4 to $10.2 trillion between December 2004 and June 
2005. Growth was particularly strong in multi-name contracts, whose notional amounts more 
than doubled to $2.9 trillion. Single-name credit default swaps (CDS) increased by 43% to $7.3 
trillion. The ISDA market survey confirms a substantial growth of CDS notional principal 
outstanding volume from $12.4 trillion (June 2005) to $17.3 trillion (December 2005). This 
information confirms that the size of the market has increased significantly in nominal terms, 
also because it does not include a substantial amount of CDS contracts that have been terminated 
before maturity by TriOptima (since inception in November 2004 until February 2006 around 
$4.5 trillion of notional volumes have been terminated).
a) Credit risk derivatives have facilitated the separate trading of credit risk, and thereby 
enhanced the management of issuer/debtor credit risk. The management of issuer/debtor credit 
risk may be considered in terms of transfer, aggregation and structuring. Single issuer/debtor 
credit risk transfer is possible thanks to financial instruments such as CDS, which allow credit 
risk to be singled out from other sources of risk (e.g. interest rate or currency risk).1 Subsequently, 
the aggregation of single credit risk into portfolio CDS (e.g. CDS indices2, facilitating credit 
risk diversification, make risk-return profiles less sensitive to the performance of individual 
issuers. In addition, these instruments are particularly efficient as hedging tools for dealers 
when issuing or trading structured credit products such as cash-flow CDOs or synthetic CDOs, 
which package a portfolio of corporate bonds or CDS respectively and slice them into 
tranches.
b) Common market standards in credit derivatives are continuously promoted both for trading 
and post-trading services: legal documentation (e.g. ISDA novation and settlement protocols), 
language for financial data communication (e.g. Financial Products Mark-up Language), trade 
confirmation formats, definitions of reference entities in credit derivatives (e.g. Reference 
Entity Database), CDS indices standards (e.g. as managed by the International Index Company), 
regular tradable credit fixings (as developed by Creditex and Markit), etc.
c) Electronic trading services and transparency: a number of structural developments have 
occurred, in particular targeting credit derivatives where an increasing number of inter-dealer 
platforms are operating. In addition, there is a growing trend for integrating trading services, 
information delivery and analytical tools into single platforms for credit-related financial 
instruments. Finally, considerable attention is also being devoted to price transparency on CDS 
(also provided by Markit) as well as applications offering post-trading efficiency gains through 
straight-through processing, trade confirmation/matching, multilateral early termination or 
portfolio reconciliation (e.g. DTCC, GlobeOp, T-Zero, Scrittura, TriOptima).  
d) In the underlying cash market, ongoing structural developments in the repo and securities 
lending market are having a notable impact on liquidity. Tri-party agents, central securities 
depositories, inter-dealer ETPs or voicebrokers are constantly enhancing their services. 
Moreover, there are demand-driven efforts to expand their services to other less traditional 
asset classes, including corporate bonds. The International Capital Markets Association 
1   Other risks which cannot as yet be traded, such as liquidity risks, are being examined by market participants. For instance, the CDS-
bond basis expresses the degree of dislocation between the cash and CDS markets. Liquidity situation and supply/demand imbalances 
may be reflected in the development of the CDS-bond basis. See also the Appendix.
2  After the June 2004 merger into a unique set of CDS indices, these standardised financial instruments have become particularly 
important for investment, trading and hedging strategies in various regional and sectoral markets.17
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European repo market survey number 9, conducted in June 2005 and published in September 
2005, recalls that “the share of collateral issued in EU countries accounted for by government 
bonds fell to 85.7%, its lowest level ever in the survey (since 2001 when it was 91.2%) and 
down from 87.8% in December 2004”. Finally, important transparency enhancements have been 
promoted by market-driven initiatives in the securities lending market (see DataExplorer). 
These initiatives, together with a broader investor universe interested in securities lending, help 
reduce funding/borrowing costs as cash and securities become more easily available.  
4.1  THE IMPACT OF RECENT INNOVATIONS IN 
CREDIT MARKETS ON THE CONCEPT OF 
SEARCH AND SYSTEMIC LIQUIDITY 
One of the most significant financial innovations 
in recent years has been the creation of liquid 
instruments that facilitate the separate trading 
of credit risk. Single-name CDS are the building 
blocks of those instruments. CDS contracts 
have nurtured a more liquid secondary market 
in credit for two main reasons. First, CDS 
contracts are more standardised than traditional 
credit risk transfer instruments. Second, CDS 
contracts allow market participants to go long 
credit risk without a cash payment, and go short 
credit risk with less difficulty and at lower cost 
than with corporate bonds.  
IMPACT ON SEARCH LIQUIDITY
The possibility to trade credit risk separately 
using credit derivatives is likely to have an 
impact on search liquidity in the following way: 
in the past, market-makers in credit markets 
were constrained in their ability to provide 
liquidity because of limits on the amount of 
credit exposure they could have on one company 
or sector. More efficient hedging strategies, 
facilitated by credit derivatives, have helped 
market-makers to trade credit risk more 
efficiently while employing less capital or 
enhancing the productivity of the existing 
capital. Credit derivatives allow market-makers 
to hold their inventory of bonds while remaining 
neutral in terms of credit risk.31 As a consequence, 
there is less urgency to find a counterparty when 
intermediating a trade. At the same time, while 
in the past larger inventories were needed to 
intermediate corporate bonds, now many more 
market participants can trade credit derivatives 
without holding the bond or without knowing 
where to find it, thereby increasing the ability to 
intermediate credit risk exposures with limited 
funding costs and use of capital. 
Moreover, the ability to take new credit 
positions, repackage them into structured credit 
products and sell them profitably, for instance 
in order to meet investors’ demand for 
diversified collateralised debt obligation (CDO) 
portfolios, has reduced the risk of having to 
hold an asset for a prolonged period of time. 
Since credit derivatives do not involve an 
upfront funding obligation, they have also 
reduced funding costs and risks when keeping 
a position open. Finally, traders’ costs and risks 
for pricing bonds are reduced. This is a direct 
consequence of the increased price transparency 
in the CDS market, which is increasingly 
accepted as a reference price source against 
which corporate bonds are priced. 
In sum, it is likely that financial innovations in 
credit markets are decreasing search costs, 
especially via the reduction of hedging and 
funding costs and risks.
IMPACT ON SYSTEMIC LIQUIDITY
Credit derivatives have the potential to have a 
positive impact on systemic liquidity via the 
following channels: 
1)  Credit derivatives can strengthen the 
resilience of the cash bond market to adverse 
market events. The rapid development of 
credit derivatives is one of the reasons for 
the smooth behaviour of the corporate bond 
31  See CRMPG II (2005).
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markets in the aftermath of the GM and Ford 
credit rating downgrades in May 2005. Cash 
bond investors can effectively unwind their 
exposures to individual bond issuers or to 
entire sectors through the use of credit 
derivatives. This gives investors the 
possibility to withstand the immediate 
impact of possible downgrades and it would 
thus become less pressing to liquidate the 
affected issuers’ bond holdings. Moreover, 
investors involved in trading-oriented 
strategies (such as some hedge funds) have 
a limited impact on the cash market as they 
typically trade in credit derivatives markets 
which offer them greater flexibility and 
liquidity, as well as facilitate the dispersion 
of credit risk.32 This seems to some extent to 
have sheltered the cash market from a rise in 
volatility after the credit event and is 
believed to enhance systemic liquidity.
2)  Credit derivatives can provide additional 
liquidity during periods of market distress. 
As explained very well in CRMPG II (2005), 
the credit derivatives market can provide 
additional liquidity during periods of market 
distress. Before the CDS market, a holder of 
a distressed or defaulted bond often had 
difficulty selling it, even at a reduced price. 
This is because cash bond traders are 
typically long risk as they own an inventory 
of bonds. As a result, they are often unwilling 
to purchase bonds and assume more risk in 
times of market stress. By contrast, credit 
derivative traders typically hold an inventory 
of protection (short risk), having bought 
protection through CDS. In distressed 
markets, investors may be able to reduce 
long risk positions by purchasing protection 
from credit derivatives traders, which in 
turn may be better placed to sell protection 
(i.e. go long risk) and change their inventory 
position from short risk to neutral. 
Furthermore, the CDS market creates natural 
buyers of defaulted bonds, as protection 
holders (short risk) buy bonds to deliver to 
the protection sellers (long risk). CDS 
markets, therefore, help to improve liquidity 
across many credit market segments.
However, while these factors may help to 
improve systemic liquidity in times of market 
distress, two important caveats need to be made. 
First, even though it is likely that the increasing 
use of credit derivatives reduces the need to 
buy/sell a bond to manage such credit risk, 
there may still be reasons why many participants 
could continue to be forced to sell a specific 
corporate bond without delay. Further work is 
needed to analyse the circumstances that could 
lead to such occurrences. In particular, a 
distinction should be made between a) firm-
specific reasons (e.g. constrained credit risk 
management, reduction of credit lines due to 
counterparty risk, margin calls, early 
redemptions, etc.), b) market-specific reasons 
(e.g. changes to the benchmark, access to repo 
and securities lending, etc.) and c) regulatory 
reasons (e.g. accounting rules, capital 
requirements, etc.).
It should also be borne in mind that in the event 
of liquidity distress credit derivatives facilitate 
the hedging of credit risk but do not necessarily 
help to stabilise corporate bond prices, as they 
have only an indirect impact on the funding risk 
of market participants, i.e. the inability to raise 
liquid funds by offloading assets or borrowing.33 
To mitigate funding risk, a well-functioning 
repo and securities lending market also in 
distressed market conditions therefore remains 
essential.34 
32  Over the last decade, new investors have entered the credit 
markets, including the credit risk transfer markets. These new 
participants, with differing risk management and investment 
objectives (including other banks seeking portfolio 
diversification), help to mitigate and absorb shocks to the 
financial system, which in the past affected primarily a few 
systemically important financial intermediaries. See IMF 
(2006), as well as Geithner (2006), for a recent speech on credit 
derivatives, risk management and related financial stability 
issues.
33  Various causes may trigger funding risk: (i) at a counterparty 
level because of deteriorating counterparty risk, margins and 
capital constraints, or (ii) at a market level because investors are 
forced to convert bonds into cash or market-makers face funding 
constraints. See also Borio (2004) and Brunnermeier (2005a). 
34  In this sense the fact that a central bank may be willing to accept 
a wide variety of assets as collateral may be an important factor 
in mitigating funding risk under stress conditions.19
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The second caveat is that through their 
uninhibited liquidity during quiet times, credit 
derivatives have the ability to reinforce herd-
like behaviour. Whereas crowded trades35 in the 
cash bond market would reveal the crowd 
through quickly rising prices, crowded trades in 
the credit derivatives market are less visible and 
potentially larger still. Crowds and concentration 
cause systemic problems when they unwind. It 
is important to note that the driver of the 
problem here is not the credit instrument, but 
the thinking behind the crowd. We will return to 
this important point in the next section.
4.2  HOW DOES THE INCREASING INTERACTION 
BETWEEN PLAIN VANILLA AND COMPLEX 
STRUCTURED CREDIT PRODUCTS AFFECT 
SYSTEMIC LIQUIDITY? 
The standardised wholesale market in single-
name CDS has promoted the creation of new 
composite products including bespoke synthetic 
CDOs and standardised CDS index tranches 
that transfer credit risk in portfolio form. The 
rapid growth of those composite products, 
which are often highly structured and leveraged 
and involve correlation and model risk, may 
have an impact on systemic liquidity.
On the one hand, portfolio instruments allow 
for a more efficient dispersion of credit risk 
across a broadened investor base. Those 
instruments provide the flexibility to customise 
financial transactions to match the individual 
risk/return profile of investors, and have 
become the main vehicle to transfer credit risk 
from banks to non-banks. Also, the enhanced 
price transparency, increased availability of 
analytical and risk management tools, the recent 
involvement of both electronic communication 
networks and multi-dealer to client platforms 
help to support this development. Fitch Ratings 
global derivative surveys confirm that the 
growth of this market is also driven by the 
greater variety of market participants, which 
now include a broader range of banks, insurance 
companies, hedge funds and, to a lesser extent, 
pension funds and asset managers. In particular 
it is reported that “hedge funds appear to be 
adding liquidity to the credit markets, as a 
growing number of individual funds pursue 
differing strategies even within the same 
sectors”. As discussed in Chapter 3, a more 
heterogeneous investor base helps to increase 
systemic liquidity.
Synthetic portfolio instruments also increase 
interlinkages between different segments of the 
bond, loan and equity markets. Stronger 
interconnections between markets can help to 
retain a broader investor base, also in distressed 
market conditions, helping systemic liquidity.
On the other hand, complex portfolio credit 
products have the potential to accentuate 
market volatility for a number of reasons: first, 
the more structured the products, and hence the 
narrower the potential investor universe, the 
less liquid their markets will be in times of 
stress. Pricing and risk measurement models 
routinely presume markets will always have the 
same liquidity as they exhibit during quiet 
times. However, for complex credit products 
assumptions about asset liquidity may not hold, 
especially in times of stress, exacerbating price 
movements. Second, complex credit products 
tend to be highly leveraged, often relying on 
short-term financing. The likelihood that they 
have to be liquidated in the event of an adverse 
market environment is greater for such 
instruments, as is the potential market impact. 
Third, the risk that leveraged investors are in 
“crowded trades” seems to be quite pronounced 
for complex credit products. A firm-specific or 
adverse market event could trigger the attempted 
simultaneous unwinding of “crowded” 
positions. Fourth, Europe has been moving to 
more mark-to-market derivatives accounting, 
resulting in high mark-to-market sensitivity for 
synthetic CDOs, which may lead to forced 
selling in a downturn. The downgrade of the 
credit ratings of GM and Ford in May 2005 
35 CRMPG II (2005) defines a crowded trade “as multiple parties 
entering into correlated trading strategies across one or more 
markets, where the aggregate volume of trades in the market(s) 
is sufficient to constrain the ability of traders to exit from the 
position on a simultaneous basis without significantly impacting 
prevailing prices”. 
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demonstrated the potential of correlation-
intensive products to dislocate parts of the 
credit markets, particularly from a liquidity 
perspective.36 
While it is too early to draw concrete conclusions 
we can make a subtle but important distinction 
between instruments and their uses. Taken at 
face value, financial innovations such as credit 
derivatives have the clear capacity to increase 
market resilience. To the extent that they 
enhance hedging capabilities, keep trading 
strategies varied and make the investor base 
broader and more diversified, credit derivatives 
could have a positive impact on systemic 
liquidity, even in stressed market conditions. 
However, as there has not yet been a downturn 
of the credit cycle, this could not have been 
sufficiently tested. Guided by our framework, 
we are concerned that these instruments also 
provide a greater capacity for investors to crowd 
into trades than in the cash market, where such 
congestion would be more visible. Moreover, 
because these instruments have, to some extent, 
been shifted from the hands of credit experts 
(banks who originate credit instruments) to 
those who lack this expertise (general 
investors),37 they may have indirectly led to a 
rise in the use of common sell “triggers” in 
valuations and correlations which lead to a 
crowd trying to exit a particular exposure or 
exposures at the same time. Our framework 
tells us that the focus of concern should shift 
from instruments to investor behaviour, in 
particular gaining a better overview of net 
exposures and concentrations, common 
strategies, as well as harmonised valuation and 
risk management techniques.  
4.3  HOW DOES THE INTERACTION BETWEEN 
CASH AND DERIVATIVE MARKETS CHAL-
LENGE TRADITIONAL LIQUIDITY CONCEPTS 
AND MEASURES? 
The enhanced trading of cash and derivative 
credit-related financial instruments deepens 
the interaction between cash and derivatives 
markets. This fact challenges the traditional 
concepts of trading liquidity: an asset is liquid 
36  These credit events demonstrated the model risk incurred by 
CDOs as assumptions in correlation trading models proved to 
be wrong. For example, prior to the GM-Ford downgrades, 
Morgan Stanley calculated that implied correlation among CDS 
index equity tranches had been running at 19% to 20%, but 
following those events it plunged to 9%. Price movements were 
exacerbated by the fact that leveraged investors tended to use 
similar models and risk management frameworks and, as a result 
of mark-to-market losses, had to unwind their positions in 
equity tranches simultaneously. As a consequence prices in 
equity tranches plunged, dislocating temporarily also the market 
for mezzanine tranches and the single credit default swap 
market that was used to hedge positions.
37  Although the welfare consequences of losses by households can 
be significant, it can also be argued that they or their investment 
agents have much larger equity and a lower probability of 
default. 
if a large size can be immediately executed with 
a limited impact on price. 
1)  Quantitative measures of corporate bond 
liquidity: Information on turnover of 
corporate bonds alone, while still important, 
is no longer sufficient to reflect the “real” 
activity in credit markets. In fact, relatively 
large size trades are increasingly executed 
in credit derivatives markets and to a lower 
extent in the corporate bond market. 
2)  Efficient price formation and liquidation 
value: When there is an idiosyncratic shock 
to the issuer credit risk, market participants 
tend to take positions first in the CDS 
market. As a consequence, changes in CDS 
spread levels are only priced into bond 
spreads in a second step, reversing the 
assumed pricing formation chain. The 
flexibility brought about by credit derivatives 
and the enhanced functioning of securities 
financing and lending facilities offer new 
investment, trading and hedging strategies 
to both dealers and investors. The former 
see their ability to provide liquidity at lower 
costs substantially enhanced, mainly thanks 
to more efficient and cheaper hedging tools; 
the latter are now able to exploit newly 
available arbitrage opportunities between 
the cash and the derivatives market, to 
manage more efficiently portfolio 
rebalancing or take desired credit/capital 
structure exposures. This affects the 
traditional way of measuring a price impact. 21
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As a result of all the new investment and 
trading strategies for both dealers and 
investors, the price formation for some 
corporate bonds can no longer be treated 
separately from derivative instruments.38 To 
illustrate this point, a lower bond turnover 
activity is not in contradiction with improved 
liquidity and perhaps lower bid-ask 
spreads. 
3)  New indicators reflecting changed liquidity 
conditions: As described in more detail in 
the Appendix, the so-called default swap 
basis or CDS-bond basis, namely the 
difference between the CDS spread and the 
par bond spread, expresses the degree of 
dislocation between the cash and the 
(unfunded) CDS market. A relevant 
proportion of the basis and its changes may 
be explained in terms of liquidity factors 
and supply/demand imbalances. When there 
are no credit risk shocks, changes to the 
basis mostly reflect variations in funding 
risk, depending closely on funding costs and 
the functioning of the repo/securities 
lending market. Compared with the past, 
trading in corporate bonds has less to do 
with issuer credit risk (due to the alternative 
investment/hedging tool in the CDS market) 
and more to do with funding risk. 
4)  Is liquidity still an “asset-specific” or an 
“issuer-specific” feature? Liquidity may be 
considered as an asset feature for a well-
identified corporate bond, for instance when 
a benchmark bond or index constituents 
have to be identified. By contrast, a CDS is 
a single instrument whose delivery option 
may refer to various obligations from the 
same issuer, not just to one particular 
corporate bond. The “novelty” is that there 
is a whole market for each individual issuer 
credit risk, with many instruments (not just 
the corporate bond) available which are 
differentiated by several types of risks (e.g. 
credit spread, default exposure, recovery 
rate). To the extent that a single-name credit 
derivative is increasingly efficient and 
liquid, the liquidity concept of the underlying 
instrument may be affected. Instead of being 
only attached to an individual corporate 
bond (asset-specific), it could be related to 
an issuer credit risk, and therefore be 
regarded as issuer-specific.39 
5  THE ROLE OF TRANSPARENCY: SOME 
PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS
How does trading transparency fit into our 
model? Trading information has both a pre-
trade and a post-trade dimension. Our focus is 
on the latter dimension, since the potential 
requirement to disclose the information on 
recently completed trades (real time) is the 
main concern of most bond market participants. 
Their concerns are summarised in the Appendix 
to this paper.
Let us look first at post-trade transparency and 
systemic liquidity. The crucial question we need 
to ask is can the observation of trading volumes 
and prices possibly increase the diversity of 
behaviour or reduce it? It would seem to us that 
in a world characterised by constraints (of 
foresight, liquidity and capital), the real-time 
observation of high turnover and falling prices 
in a bond that seldom trades is more likely to 
motivate a seller than a buyer. At the very least 
it raises the risk that a contrarian buyer may 
have to sell at a lower price unless he can afford 
to wait.  Against this background, real-time 
post-trade transparency is unlikely to improve 
systemic liquidity. That is not to say that the 
opposite holds, i.e. that low post-trade 
transparency improves systemic liquidity, as it 
is likely that the information gap left by an 
absence of post-trade transparency would, in 
stressful times, be filled by speculative 
rumours. 
38  This is due to the strategies involving both CDS and corporate 
bonds (possibly financed in the repo market), which are targeted 
at exploiting mispricings. The increased activity in the CDS and 
credit repo market leads to a compression of bid/offer spreads, 
even if outright transactions on corporate bonds are not 
increased.
39 This is also consistent with the fact that dealers’ desks are 
increasingly segmented by type of risks (interest rate risk, 
currency risk and credit risk) rather than by type of instruments, 
unless more complex structured credit products are involved.
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What about search liquidity? Earlier we 
mentioned that search liquidity has two 
components, an estimate of search costs, and an 
uncertainty premium around that estimate. 
Observing trading turnover and patterns could 
be used to develop a clearer picture of the 
ability to find buyers or sellers at any one time. 
This picture could reduce uncertainty and 
information asymmetry, which should improve 
search liquidity marginally, though it is not 
clear that it would reduce the estimate of search 
costs as one would still not know where to look 
for a buyer if one wanted to sell or vice versa. 
Pre-trade-transparency, by alerting buyers and 
sellers to the dealers or the multilateral trading 
facility, may have a bigger, if again, indirect 
impact on reducing search costs and improving 
price discovery. This search difficulty is 
mitigated when pre-trade transparency can be 
used to find dealers and through them learn 
about demand and supply, or more generally 
when it is known which market or multilateral 
trading facility attracts activity in the financial 
instruments to be traded. 
In a similar way, transparency of holdings could 
support search liquidity. If a buyer of a rare 
bond were to know the current and past holders, 
the cost of finding a seller – search liquidity – 
would be lower. However, it is recognised that 
transparency of holdings could lead to a 
substantial reduction in systemic liquidity if the 
market begins to front run a sale by an investor, 
whose holding in a particular bond is badly 
underwater and hitting its risk limit. It is alleged 
that knowledge of LTCM’s portfolio helped 
banks front run LTCM’s attempt to get out of 
certain markets, therefore collapsing liquidity 
and prices (see also Brunnermeier 2005b). This 
is why the focus of the debate has been on pre- 
and post-trade transparency of flows and 
prices.
It should also be noted that search costs and 
uncertainty could be reduced by enhanced 
transparency in the CDS market. First, in the 
case of liquid CDS single names, transparency 
in the CDS market may make real-time post-
trade transparency for price discovery purposes 
in corporate bonds less important or even 
unnecessary. Second, it facilitates the monitoring 
of the CDS-bond basis and fosters its trading, 
which in turn increases search liquidity and 
price efficiency. Third, as an increasing number 
of market participants can trade credit 
derivatives without holding the bond, it may 
become less crucial, unless there is a high risk 
of default,40 to know who owns the deliverable 
bonds referenced to highly traded single-name 
CDS. 
Our first observation, therefore, is that while 
improving trading liquidity is an important 
goal, it is not necessarily well served by 
focusing on real-time post-trade transparency. 
It does not improve systemic liquidity, and at 
times could make it worse. It does reduce the 
uncertainty component of search liquidity, but 
only improves search liquidity by acting as a 
proxy for more detailed pre-trade transparency 
or some form of holdings transparency. That is 
not to say that post-trade transparency could 
not play an important role in the broader context 
of market efficiency and investor protection. 
Indeed, post-trade transparency may be helpful 
in measuring liquidity for portfolio valuation 
and collateral purposes, and for policing best 
execution rules. But in order to avoid potentially 
negative implications for systemic liquidity, it 
would have to be published with an appropriate 
delay. CDS transparency would also help search 
liquidity without harming systemic liquidity. 
There is an interesting parallel here with 
post-trade transparency of foreign exchange 
intervention by central banks. Rightly or 
wrongly, the revealed preference during the last 
three major foreign exchange crises (EMS, 
1992-1993, Mexico, 1994-1995, Asia, 1997-
1998) is for central banks to reduce post-trade 
40  In this specific context, the availability of holding information 
may: (i) facilitate the search for defaulted bond of buyers of 
protection who have to physically deliver the bond after a credit 
event has been notified; (ii) ease the (physical) settlement 
process of CDS contracts in the event of an issuer default. Both 
aspects avoid triggering shock events which are negative for 
systemic liquidity.23
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transparency during an environment where they 
are worried about systemic issues, but to 
increase post-trade transparency during quiet 
times. Since these crises, central banks have 
moved towards greater transparency in reserve 
changes, but those that have increased the 
frequency of this transparency do not yet appear 
to have received much benefit in terms of 
increased investor confidence.41 
One could think of a couple of adaptations to a 
rule on the transparency of holdings that 
improved search liquidity without damaging 
systemic liquidity. One solution is delayed 
transparency of holdings. By providing data on 
who held an asset with an appropriate delay and 
frequency, there is little risk of systemic 
liquidity worsening, as there is a good 
probability that holdings have changed. 
However, by providing information on the 
players who may be holding a bond, search 
liquidity would be improved. An alternative, 
which is not mutually exclusive, would be to 
disclose who currently holds what assets, but to 
provide no information on quantities above a 
minimal threshold. Furthermore, as hinted at 
above, properly delayed post-trade transparency 
of aggregated prices and volumes, for each 
financial instrument and by trading venue, may 
increase search liquidity without having an 
impact on systemic liquidity. While the 
identification of who has carried out the trade 
may affect systemic liquidity, disclosing where 
certain financial instruments are generally 
traded can help search liquidity without 
worsening systemic liquidity.  
With adaptation we may be able to improve 
search liquidity without harming systemic 
liquidity, but neither pre- nor post-trade 
transparency is likely to improve systemic 
liquidity. It is likely that other forms of 
transparency and detail would be more valuable. 
The interaction between cash and derivative 
credit instruments makes it more difficult to 
monitor and understand homogeneous investor 
behaviour based on cash trading and holding 
information data only. However, assessing the 
amount of risk transferred through credit 
derivative instruments raises methodological 
challenges, and is the subject of ongoing 
complex research. In this regard, more and 
better data on net credit risk exposures and on 
concentration – which tend to build up easily in 
highly leveraged and opaque markets such as 
the synthetic CDO market – could have 
considerable benefits in mitigating current 
shortcomings in liquidity risk management.42 In 
fact, CRMPG II (2005) identified the occurrence 
of crowded trades and a concentration of large 
exposures as a major potential risk that makes 
it difficult to estimate accurately a liquidity 
stress.43
Our framework suggests that, to a large extent, 
transparency initiatives have so far been 
tangential to issues of “search liquidity” and 
deaf to issues of “systemic liquidity”, and on 
occasions even harmful. Yet systemic liquidity 
is probably the more pressing concern for 
central banks. Systemic liquidity is about 
homogeneity, concentration and behaviour, and 
bringing more transparency to these issues 
remains both vital and neglected.
6 CONCLUSION
The concept of trading liquidity in non-
government bond markets remains elusive. The 
academic literature examining factors that drive 
trading liquidity in corporate bond markets is 
sparse. Much of the literature is based on 
experience of equity markets. As is argued in 
Chapter 2, the numerous structural differences 
between equities and bonds make it difficult to 
transfer findings from the equity to the bond 
market. It is also difficult to draw lessons from 
41  See Metcalfe (2003).
42  Leading indicators of distress have been developed only for 
currency markets (see IMF 2002) and for some liquid equity and 
treasury markets (see Tarashev 2003), where data are more 
easily available. 
43  See also IMF (2006) and Joint Forum (2005). Finally, Fitch 
(2005d) highlights that “existing standards of financial 
disclosure do not provide enough of an insight into firm level 
positions and exposures, particularly with reference to how 
credit derivatives and credit structured products are used to 
either mitigate, diversify or take on additional risks”. 
6 CONCLUSION24
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the US experience with enhanced trading 
transparency in corporate bond markets due to 
the fundamental structural differences between 
the US and EU bond markets. 
In this paper we do not claim to have brought 
trading liquidity in non-government bond 
markets out of the shadows and into the sunlight, 
but the framework and concepts discussed here 
may help to bring greater definition. Our simple 
analytical framework for trading liquidity 
should be applicable also to European corporate 
bonds that trade relatively seldom. It 
distinguishes between two types of liquidity, 
search and systemic liquidity, which may act 
against each other, depending on market 
conditions. During “quiet” times, the liquidity 
premium is driven by “search” costs, i.e. the 
cost in time, information asymmetries, and 
capital, funding, inventory and research costs 
required for a trader to locate a willing buyer 
for an asset that he has purchased. In distressed 
market conditions, the driver of the liquidity 
premium is the homogeneity of investors. If 
investors are homogeneous in their behaviour, 
the trading liquidity disappears down a black 
hole. This framework makes it possible to 
examine the search or systemic avenues along 
which any development, be it financial 
innovation or improved transparency, will have 
an impact on liquidity.
The possibility to trade separately credit risk 
via credit derivatives is likely to reduce search 
costs by improving the ability of dealers to 
manage and hedge credit risks, also in large 
sizes. Credit derivatives also have the potential 
to affect positively systemic liquidity, since 
they lessen the urgency or the need to liquidate 
a bond subject to an adverse market. Moreover, 
they may provide additional liquidity during 
periods of market distress, since credit derivative 
desks could be better positioned to increase 
their credit risk exposure than cash investors. 
Finally, the creation of new composite products 
that transfer credit risk in portfolio form have 
allowed for the dispersion of credit risk across 
a broadened investor base, with the potential 
for increasing diversity in behaviour. Overall, it 
is too early to draw any conclusions about 
whether financial innovations such as credit 
risk derivatives have increased market resilience. 
To the extent that they enhance hedging 
capabilities, keep trading strategies varied and 
make the investor base broader and more 
diversified, also in distressed market conditions, 
credit derivatives may have a positive impact on 
systemic liquidity. 
However, there has not been a downturn of the 
credit cycle yet, hence it has not been possible 
to test this sufficiently, also because credit 
derivatives provide a greater capacity for 
investors to crowd into trades than in the cash 
market where such congestion would be more 
visible. Crowding and behaviour homogeneity 
will reduce systemic liquidity. Moreover, 
because these instruments have, to some extent, 
been shifted from the hands of credit experts to 
those who lack this expertise, these instruments 
may have indirectly led to a rise in the use of 
common sell “triggers” in valuations and 
correlations, which lead to a crowd trying to 
exit a particular exposure or exposures at the 
same time. 
Our framework tells us that the focus of concern 
should shift from instruments and turnover to 
behaviour and to considering how best to 
encourage liquidity increasing behaviour rather 
than liquidity reducing behaviour. A useful 
analogy might be that we have introduced a new 
product: “insurance” that appears to be used by 
people not looking for insurance. It is not the 
instrument which creates liquidity concerns but 
the way market participants may be using 
them. 
The conceptual framework also allows us to 
shed some light on the ongoing debate into 
what is the optimal degree of trading 
transparency in secondary bond markets. We 
believe that, from the perspective of promoting 
liquidity, the focus on post-trade transparency 
may be wrong. Post-trade transparency only 
supports search liquidity by acting as a proxy 
for detailed pre-trade transparency and some 
form of holdings transparency, while it may 25
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harm systemic liquidity if it is disclosed real 
time. The observation of high trading volumes 
and rapidly changing prices may reduce the 
diversity of investor behaviour in stressed 
market conditions. Focusing on encouraging 
more detailed pre-trade transparency and forms 
of transparency of bond holdings may prove 
more useful in terms of improving search 
liquidity. And if transparency of holdings was 
delayed, or neutral to quantity, it may not 
negatively affect systemic liquidity.
We do not see how pre- or post-trade 
transparency can improve systemic liquidity. 
But other forms of transparency may. The most 
promising avenue could be an enhanced 
availability of data on net exposures or 
concentration of positions. This type of 
information could indeed help market 
participants and competent authorities to 
properly value, manage and price the increasing 
risks of homogeneous behaviour, which possibly 
causes crowded trades, makes the market more 
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APPENDIX
The ECB currently hosts a series of seminars 
where financial market participants present 
their views and share their market knowledge 
and expertise in a relatively informal 
environment with interested experts from 
various ECB business areas. The primary 
objective has been twofold: a) to gain a better 
understanding of how credit markets function 
and of the different roles various market 
participants play in the market; and b) to 
perform a first fact-finding exercise in order to 
understand market participants’ concerns as 
regards the possible extension of transparency 
requirements to debt instruments. This annex 
aims to provide an initial summary of the 
evidence collected so far during the seminars at 
the ECB.
HOW MARKET PARTICIPANTS DEFINE LIQUIDITY
The general view of most of the participants 
was that a well-functioning market is a market 
in which buyers and sellers can: 
–  make well-informed investment and risk 
management decisions;
–  transact business at reasonable cost;
–  have confidence in the prices they receive;
–  have certainty about the settlement and their 
entitlement to the property of the acquired 
asset;
–  value portfolios reasonably and accurately.
Liquidity in the traditional sense is defined as 
the ability to execute transactions at short 
notice, at low cost and with little impact on 
price. It depends to a great extent on the 
microstructure of the particular market and 
generalisations about liquidity are often not 
possible.44 It was also argued that liquidity is 
important to attract investors and borrowers, to 
allow proper asset and liability management 
and to promote market resilience to crises. A 
rather common view was that it is restrictive to 
relate liquidity only to turnover and narrow bid-
ask spreads, and to expect that liquidity is stable 
and symmetrical for sales and purchases. In the 
opinion of many participants, an important 
determinant of liquidity was the diversity in the 
investor base. A rather exhaustive list of factors 
affecting bond market liquidity was provided.45 
Some participants argued that what is important 
is not just the level of liquidity but also its 
variability under normal and especially stress 
conditions. There was another dimension to the 
definition of liquidity when it was said to be 
important to distinguish between the ability or 
commitment to provide two-way prices (usually 
very difficult in corporate bonds) and the 
relatively easier to provide “bid-side liquidity” 
(i.e. the ability of the dealer to show a binding 
price at which he is willing to buy a bond from 
the bond holder) that most institutional investors 
are interested in, because it gives them the 
opportunity to liquidate their bond position 
without delay.
HOW MARKET PARTICIPANTS MEASURE LIQUIDITY
Concerning the measurability of liquidity, 
market participants generally confirmed that it 
is very difficult to measure corporate bond 
liquidity risk, not least because of the 
unavailability of trading data. No straightforward 
measure seems to exist at present. However, 
there are some indicators which may provide 
some information that allow important changes 
in liquidity conditions to be observed. When 
relevant data are available, the so-called default 
swap basis or CDS-bond basis, namely the 
difference between the CDS spread and the cash 
bond spread, is under constant examination by 
market participants, mainly for trading 
purposes. Although in theory there is a risk-free 
44    An ideally functioning market would be characterised by 
maximal and stable liquidity. In such a market, prices would not 
be driven by shifts in liquidity and would entirely reflect 
fundamentals.
45  Namely multiplicity of issues, size of issue, capital required to 
support liquidity, central bank eligibility, repo market, time 
since issuance, credit rating, ability to hedge interest rate risk, 
ability to hedge credit risk, diversity and type of investors, 
Business to Business (B2B) and B2Customer trading platforms, 
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arbitrage opportunity between the two spreads, 
which should lead to a basis of zero, there are a 
number of reasons why such a spread exists. 
Some factors are described as fundamental 
because they relate to the precise specification 
of a CDS contract that makes it different from 
a cash bond. Others are described as market 
factors because they refer to the nature of the 
market in which cash and CDS (which is an 
unfunded instrument) are traded.46 The CDS-
bond basis expresses the degree of dislocation 
between the cash and CDS markets. Increasing 
empirical evidence and some anecdotal evidence 
by market participants suggests that a significant 
proportion of the basis and its changes may be 
explained in terms of liquidity factors and 
supply/demand imbalances. 
Under normal conditions, if credit spreads 
narrow, bid-offer spreads normally shrink (both 
for cash and derivatives) but, more importantly, 
the cost of funding is cheaper. In such a scenario 
the basis tends to increase up to a certain 
potential cap, when market players will find it 
more convenient to sell the bond and sell 
protection (arbitrage opportunity). Such 
“positive basis trades” increase price efficiency 
and reduce mispricing. However, it is constrained 
by the difficulty of borrowing and shorting 
corporate bonds. An increasingly efficient 
reverse repo/securities lending market in 
corporate bonds may mitigate such constraints 
and further close mispricings.
In stressed market conditions, when the source 
of stress is the cost of funding, the basis can 
become more negative (or cheaper). This is 
because investors/banks whose funding costs 
increase will prefer to sell protection rather 
than buy the bond. The possibility of funding 
the position on repo, at cheaper funding costs, 
is important as it provides a floor to the basis 
and accordingly to price dislocations between 
the cash and derivates markets. This is 
particularly the case when firms face constraints 
when using their own balance sheets or increased 
costs related to uncollateralised borrowing. In 
fact, the so-called “negative basis trade” implies 
buying the bond and buying CDS protection for 
the same reference entity. The possibility of 
executing such a trade, cheaply financed on 
repo, attracts other “natural” buyers in a market 
of forced sellers, thereby increasing liquidity and 
reducing the price impact in the market. When 
the source of stress is related to idiosyncratic 
issuer credit risk, the basis can become more 
positive, reflecting attempts by investors/banks 
to buy protection in the more liquid CDS market 
instead of selling the more illiquid bonds. 
The CDS-bond basis is the result of a trading 
activity which is nowadays very frequent, 
although there are no longer as many arbitrage 
opportunities as there were recently. Lower 
funding costs and more liquid single-name CDS 
markets allow relatively sophisticated 
unconstrained investors to better exploit 
arbitrage opportunities between the cash and 
the derivative markets, thereby promoting price 
efficiency and liquidity.  
FUNCTIONING/STRUCTURE/ORGANISATION OF 
CREDIT MARKETS
The bond markets have, over time, developed 
certain structures and standards that serve them 
well in fulfilling their role of allocating 
resources between investors and borrowers. 
Certain specific observations and recent 
innovations worth mentioning are summarised 
below.
One recent trend, especially significant in the 
European markets with their highly competitive 
environment, is the growing importance of 
electronic trading platforms (ETPs), which now 
take a lion’s share in trading the more liquid 
bond sectors (especially government bonds) in 
both the dealer-to-dealer and dealer-to-client 
spaces. Via a concentration of buyers and sellers 
in one place, which makes ETPs similar to 
exchanges, ETPs can significantly improve 
secondary market liquidity; however the trading 
taking place on the ETP should still be 
considered mainly OTC and not exchange-
based, as it involves bilateral trading and 
46 See also McAdie (2001). 35
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clearing and settlement relationships. ETPs 
may be either inter-dealer (B2B) platforms or 
dealer-to-client (B2C) platforms (including 
both multiple- and single-dealer systems). 
Inter-dealer platforms tend to focus on 
homogeneous financial instruments with high 
trading frequency and volumes, generally with 
limited issuer credit risk (e.g. government 
bonds, supranationals, Pfandbriefe, etc.) and 
low information risk. Their contribution to 
market functioning is mainly in terms of 
efficient trading and post-trading services. 
Dealer-to-customer platforms allow trading in 
both government and corporate bonds, yet they 
currently seem better placed to provide markets 
in corporate or other less frequently traded 
bonds. Moreover, most investment firms have 
their own single dealer platforms, which they 
generally use to offer their inventory. One of 
the rather remarkable developments, benefiting 
mainly investors, is the integration of the 
trading platforms and information delivery and 
financial analysis services which has taken 
place over the past few years.
The  structural differences between the bond 
and equity markets, and also between the US 
and European markets, have been highlighted 
by several participants, as they have a direct 
impact on how the markets function.
Unlike equities, with their centralised trading 
on exchanges, bonds have traditionally traded 
bilaterally in the over-the-counter (OTC) 
market. The reasons behind this fundamental 
difference in market structure are rather 
obvious: while there is usually just one single 
equity issue by a particular corporate issuer to 
which fungible tranches can be added over time, 
the same issuer may have at any moment in time 
up to several hundred bond issues outstanding 
with different features (e.g. maturity, coupon 
rate, currency etc.). The lack of homogeneity 
makes bilateral negotiation necessary as details 
need to be agreed between buyer and seller 
before a transaction can be concluded. The 
concentration of equity trades in an exchange 
was also deemed necessary for enhancing 
liquidity, as well as other reasons, including 
investor protection. As bond holders have 
traditionally been large institutional investors 
who are more likely to be able to look after their 
interests, the issue of investor protection was 
not so pressing in the bond markets. 
Differences between the US and European bond 
markets were mentioned several times during 
the presentations, and they are particularly 
important for the functioning of the corporate 
bond markets. In European markets the dealers 
usually act as principals to the transaction, 
buying the bonds in their own name. There are 
usually more dealers competing for a trade 
simultaneously and the prices shown to the 
investors are often executable, meaning that the 
dealer may end up with a bond position on his 
books he has to finance and hedge for some 
time before a buyer can be found. While in the 
United States this model prevails as well, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that the practice of 
dealers acting on an agency basis (where they 
work out a sell order which is often exclusive 
for a client and when a buyer is found the 
transaction is completed without the dealers 
committing their own capital) is more 
widespread than in Europe, especially in less 
liquid segments of the market.
While these differences have a direct bearing 
on the market-making ability and appetite of 
dealers, they also affect the level of transparency 
in the two markets. Transparency was 
significantly improved with the more widespread 
use of ETPs, especially in the European markets. 
The ETPs play a key role in creating the 
potential for a high degree of transparency 
across the whole trading process. Participants 
in trading platforms are generally able to view 
and compare quotes, which may be executable 
for approved customers of the dealers, or 
indicative. This pre-trade transparency 
facilitates both competitive pricing and 
investors’ ability to execute at the best available 
price among those offered by dealers on a multi-
dealer platform. Pre-trade prices are usually 
made available to non-platform participants via 
distribution networks, but on an indicative basis 
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only and often at a cost. Well-established pre-
trade price transparency exists as provided by 
commercial data providers or for approved 
customers of the dealers on dealer-to-customer 
trading platforms. This is particularly true with 
respect to European government and high-grade 
bonds, although in the lower credit quality (i.e. 
less liquid) markets it may still be somewhat 
limited.47 There is, however, little pre-trade 
price visibility for the retail investor.
In terms of post-trade transparency, ETPs 
generally provide reference and closing prices, 
together with audit trail information to prove 
best execution to customers, regulators and 
other relevant parties. In addition, some 
statistics on individual and market performance 
are provided to both clients and dealers by most 
trading platforms. Generally, limited 
information that is only aggregated by market 
sector is available on traded volumes. Dealers, 
which are often the major stakeholders of ETPs, 
are normally reluctant to allow ETPs to make 
this information available to other market 
participants. Post-trade prices of approximately 
11,000 corporate bonds (estimated at 70% to 
80% of the total) are also reported by more than 
40 market-makers to various European 
regulators via ICMA’s TRAX system and 
published on a next day basis. Individual volume 
averages are published once a month, helping to 
gauge liquidity (daily volumes are not available 
for the time being). In general, industry 
associations (e.g. BMA 2005) confirm that a 
great deal of post-trade price (but not necessarily 
volume) transparency exists in European 
government and high-grade corporate bond 
markets for institutional investors. A certain 
level of post-trade price information is also 
accessible to the retail sector. However, this 
information is available on a more delayed and 
not very user-friendly basis for a more limited 
number of bonds and at a cost (although several 
platforms do make post-trade prices available 
free of charge on their websites on a delayed 
basis).
Concerning bond holding transparency, there 
may be various reasons for investors to disclose 
their holdings (dealers would usually opt to 
refrain from disclosing their positions). The 
marketing incentives, where funds disclose 
publicly their holdings to attract investors, can 
be catered for by commercially available 
services. For example, several major financial 
services providers currently offer consolidated 
information on a number of funds’ bond 
holdings, together with additional analytical 
tools. Regulatory requirements exist, too, for 
disclosing portfolio holdings. For instance, US 
registered mutual funds, insurance company 
funds and public pensions funds are mandated 
to report individual bond holdings’ information 
at a semi-annual, quarterly and annual frequency 
respectively and normally within 60 days of the 
reporting date. In Europe, Registered Mutual 
Funds, Sicavs, Publicums Fonds, Unit Trusts & 
OEICs are requested to report on a semi-annual 
basis, typically with a 60-day delay.
Sometimes, thanks to specific agreements with 
investors or with some national industry 
representatives, services may be enhanced or 
doors opened to financial innovations which were 
not anticipated when the regulatory transparency 
requirements for holdings were mandated. For 
example, holding information may be collected 
with a higher frequency (monthly) and a shorter 
delay (30 days) but not necessarily publicly 
disseminated. The service provider is able to 
construct specific holding-based indices, which 
differ from the composition of the traditional 
bond indices, and offers to investors various 
complementary information which is available 
via ad-hoc asset managers’ surveys.
In other cases, specific arrangements between 
the parties may grant dealers privileged access 
to investors’ portfolios. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that this is more frequently the case 
for insurance companies or pension funds which 
hold relatively less liquid bonds. In return 
dealers offer daily valuation services or identify 
ad-hoc trading opportunities.
47  It was argued in this context that the limited availability of price 
indications may not necessarily be a result of a market failure 
but rather a mere expression of the fact that for illiquid 
instruments prices are simply not easy to obtain.37
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Furthermore, one market expert proposed his 
concept of transparency: a market may be 
considered transparent if there is full disclosure 
of information to regulators, who have a duty to 
disseminate information to market participants 
on where concentrations lie and where they are 
developing. Market disclosure of flows and 
positions should be full and complete, but 
delivered within different time horizons based 
on whether information can be abused by short-
term traders. The speed with which information 
is disseminated is fairly crucial and may be 
problematic for certain market participants. For 
instance, arbitrageurs make markets more 
liquid, but they could not operate if their 
positions were made public instantly. The trade-
off between liquidity and transparency is 
particularly relevant when investors focus on 
the short term. 
Overall, there was consensus that many 
commercially-driven steps towards achieving 
pre-trade transparency have been taken in 
Europe. Regarding post-trade transparency, the 
industry is not ruling out considering market-
driven initiatives to improve post-trade 
transparency, historical prices and volumes, 
before regulatory requirements impose more 
costs and ultimately disincentives to commit 
risk capital. However, if the objective is to have 
a complete database on EU trading activities, 
an EU regulatory intervention mandating 
relevant private entities to collect this 
information will probably be necessary. For the 
subsequent consolidation and dissemination, 
there was a consensus that (existing) market-
led initiatives should be the driving forces.
CONCERNS WITH REGULATORY CHANGES AND 
PROPOSALS
The implementation of the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID) will be a major 
milestone in terms of the functioning of the EU 
financial markets and the overall regulatory 
framework on investment services. The debate 
among market participants and regulators about 
the possible extension of transparency 
requirements to transactions in classes of 
financial instruments other than shares48 is 
gaining increasing attention by the whole 
financial markets community. This part of the 
Appendix attempts to collate market participants’ 
concerns that may become relevant should more 
regulatory-driven transparency be mandated, as 
is sometimes suggested in the debates surrounding 
the implementation of the MiFID. The focus is 
therefore on the analysis of the potential impact 
of these measures on the functioning of the 
European corporate bond market from the 
viewpoint of market participants. Other regulatory 
considerations, such as investor protection and 
market integrity, are not considered.
Regarding pre-trade transparency information, 
investment firms with large euro-denominated 
corporate bond books object to the need for 
further pre-trade transparency and seem satisfied 
with the current level. It was also added that 
pre-trade transparency is commercially driven 
and that post-trade transparency would be of 
limited value to institutions with access to pre-
trade transparency.
Moreover, smaller dealers noted that a more 
transparent environment (price, volumes and 
holdings) favours brokers (trades done on an 
agent basis) more than traders (trades done on 
a principal basis). However, large, leading 
dealers who commit a lot of capital with large 
trading books may be more competitive in a less 
transparent environment.
Another view considered the position of large 
investors, which can probably demand as much 
pre-trade transparency from their dealers as 
they need, and hence do not need any more.49 In 
48  The MiFID currently provides for the application of transparency 
rules to equity markets only. The European Commission has 
stated that rules on the transparency of transactions are needed 
to ensure the effective integration of Member States’ financial 
markets, to promote the efficiency of the overall price formation 
process for financial instruments, and to assist the effective 
operation of “best execution” obligations. The European 
Commission has been mandated to submit a review on an 
extension of transparency rules to non-equity markets to the 
European Parliament by the end of October 2007.
49  This position was also confirmed by the intervention of the 
representative of the Association of British Insurers during a 
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fact, large investors obtain higher price 
transparency than smaller investors and might 
therefore consider that this comparative 
advantage could be eroded if price transparency 
were legislated. It was also added that large 
issuers may not always support transparent and 
liquid bond markets. It is not always necessarily 
the case that the greater the transparency and 
liquidity of bonds, the lower the cost of capital.50 
Nevertheless, in terms of overall market 
benefits, the views were in favour of more 
transparency, which should not be pursued with 
regulations – a relatively heavy-handed and 
static instrument with which to handle dynamic 
and carefully-balanced markets. Another 
interesting recommendation was that the 
establishment of a transparency and liquidity 
rating system should be explored, if necessary 
sponsored by the public sector with a view to 
subsequent privatisation. It would imply some 
qualitative differentiation (with a rating or 
score) among assets with different levels of 
liquidity or which are subject to different 
transparency requirements. It would provide 
issuers with a strong incentive to improve the 
liquidity and price transparency of their 
issues.
As the debate on the possible changes to the 
price transparency regime has been going on 
for some time, market participants seem to be 
increasingly resigned to the fact that some form 
of post-trade transparency regulation will come 
in, and mostly as a result of the existence of 
TRACE in the United States. Market participants 
wish to be able to engage in an open debate 
with EU regulators to ensure that such a 
regulation, if any, is shaped in a way that takes 
account of the unique structure of the bond 
market, its diversity and innovative nature, as 
well as of the important differences between the 
state of the EU and US bond markets.  The 
recent formation of the Global Capital Markets 
Board, comprising TBMA, ICMA and ISDA, 
should help to ensure that the industry speaks 
with one voice on this and other issues.
The experience with TRACE in the United 
States suggests that liquidity does not 
necessarily dry up when post-trade transparency 
is enhanced. Along similar lines, the three 
recent academic publications based on TRACE 
data present the benefits of transparency in 
terms of a substantial reduction in transaction 
costs, particularly for retail trades but to some 
extent also for institutional investors. The 
availability of this information is also promoting 
a number of other structural developments and 
financial innovations for the US corporate bond 
market.51 The evidence obtained from these 
studies is, however, often questioned because it 
is feared that the results, while showing 
correlation between the introduction of TRACE 
and a narrowing of bid-ask spreads (used as a 
measure for transaction costs), may not 
necessarily confirm causality. According to 
market participants, these studies, while using 
control groups to try to isolate the impact of 
transparency from other factors, do not take 
into account the parallel credit rally, the 
improvements in commercially driven pre-trade 
transparency or the positive contributions of the 
CDS market to the price discovery mechanism. 
Moreover, it is also mentioned that the historical 
TRACE data underlying the findings of the 
studies have not been made publicly available 
for independent review.52 Against this 
background, when considering policies affecting 
a dealership market, the challenge is to take 
fully into account the trade-off of transparency 
with both liquidity and efficiency, in particular 
in the less liquid securities. With regard to the 
high yield sector, a survey commissioned by 
TBMA showed a number of concerns from the 
buy-side. Two-thirds of investors (and three-
quarters of the most active investors, with below 
50  In many cases, structured transactions, often privately placed 
and therefore highly illiquid, achieve a lower cost of borrowing 
for issuers. At the same time, it was acknowledged that large 
issuers would not be able to cover all their funding needs 
without the benchmark transactions.
51  Examples of these developments are: a) the launch of “active” 
corporate bond indices whose prices are weighted by effective 
TRACE volumes; b) the set-up of tools for the analysis of 
historical trading patterns; and c) the reported reduction and 
transparency of commissions charged by investment funds, 
etc.
52  In June 2006, the NASD published a “Notice to Members” 
requesting comments on its intention to provide public access to 
historic TRACE data that have not been publicly available in the 
past.39
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investment-grade trading volumes over USD1 
billion) did not believe increased transparency 
to be beneficial to their ability to manage their 
portfolio, mainly due to the fear of close to 
real-time information dissemination. It is 
nevertheless increasingly recognised that more 
transparency can promote market culture, 
investor confidence and the ability of market 
participants to analyse and monitor the pattern 
of trading activity and make more informed 
investment/trading choices.
The greatest concern is now over a possible 
“big bang” scenario which mirrors exactly the 
MiFID equity transparency regime and targets 
primarily retail investor needs. In the United 
States, the implementation has been gradually 
piloted over the years by the self-regulatory 
organisation NASD, with the substantial 
involvement of the financial industry via the 
BMA. The TRACE system offers some level of 
disclosure “protections” for large trades and for 
non-investment grade bonds. At the same time, 
when considering the two alternatives of a) 
partial size information published in real time 
and b) full-size information published with an 
appropriate delay, the US approach favours the 
first option, whereas large EU dealers seem to 
prefer the second, normally with a one-day 
delay. This could possibly be attributed to the 
fact that in the United States there is much less 
pre-trade transparency than in the European 
Union and therefore real-time post-trade 
transparency provides comparable benefits to 
pre-trade transparency. According to US 
regulators, real-time dissemination is mainly a 
system cost issue and is not so much related to 
dealers’ hedging concerns, which would call for 
an additional degree of caution in the more 
fragmented European markets. Indeed, large 
dealers in particular fear that if post-trade 
transparency is too close to real-time 
dissemination, this will be costly from a system 
viewpoint, and particularly problematic for 
trading activity in relatively illiquid bonds.
Regarding post-trade transparency, in principle 
the market is much more open than in the past. 
However, the debate on the EU optimal 
transparency regime and the way to pursue it 
has just begun and should take into account EU 
structural differences versus those in the United 
States, bond specificities versus equities, and 
the structural developments in the credit 
derivatives market. The major opposition 
appears to come from consolidated market 
leaders, who fear that the “big bang transparency” 
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